OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: FIRST STEPS ON THE LONG ROAD TOWARD SUCCESSFUL UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN IRAQ
Like an earlier generation, America is answering new dangers with firm resolve. No matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult the task, we will fight the enemy, and lift the shadow of fear, and lead free nations to victory.
-U.S. President George W. Bush 8 March 2005
The U.S. strategy to achieve democratic reform in the Middle East, eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction and effects, and eliminate the nuclei of global terrorism is indeed challenging and risky but it is nonetheless achievable. The United States has stepped forward to promote and back up, through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means, the principles for which it stands. In the love-hate relationship that defines the American and Arab intercourse, America may be on the verge, through the momentum that it is creating, of setting the conditions that will positively change the Middle East forever.
Initial success in Afghanistan holds great promise for the United States as well as those in the Middle East who are exhausted by the lifelong corruption, violence, and oppression that crushes their hopes. The United States is beginning to sense such success in Iraq, though the environment is much more complex than Afghanistan. In the period of more than two years since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S.-led coalition has experienced successes and failures. Many of its failures have been self-inflicted and served only to delay progress at significant cost in lives, coalition and Iraqi.
Undoubtedly, the United States will leave a legacy in Iraq. The legacy it leaves will be governed by its attitude, commitment, ideals, and the end state it strives to achieve there: a stable, peaceful government, mindful of civil rights, that represents the people and builds institutions and checks and balances to guarantee that an individual or group will have an almost impossible task seizing power in a coup d'état or through manipulations over time. To help Iraq secure these goals, therefore, America must remain engaged there for the foreseeable future. A host of reasons, not the least of which are economic benefits to all parties and stability in the greater Arab Middle East, require it.
Though America is a 'lightning rod' in the Middle East, ironically it is the greatest hope for millions there. Despite the oft-stated outrage against America, teahouse and academic discussions and even Arab journalism spoke of hope for reform in the Middle East in the muted euphoria of Saddam's ouster and subsequent capture as well as the success of Afghani and Iraqi national elections. However, much more remains to be done.
This thesis sheds light on the environment, decisions, and consequences thereof as the U.S.-led coalition embarked on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to liberate Iraq in March 2003, and then began the arduous and complex process of rebuilding in the midst of growing Iraqi discontent and the emergence of numerous insurgencies. With history and current and future environments to guide, this thesis concludes by recommending actions and approaches that will see the new and democratic Iraq from its infancy to maturity.
The international community has a grand and historical opportunity in Iraq. The implications of success or failure cannot be understated. In order to be successful over the long term, the U.S. approach must be multi-faceted and attended by application its resources and people, for the foreseeable future. A well thought out and executed plan in Iraq may actually serve as a centerpiece on which our policies toward that region are built while at the same time inspiring regional reforms.
BACKGROUND
The United States is decisively engaged in Iraq as in Afghanistan and South Korea and until only recently Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As a nation, Americans have accepted and for the most part supported more than fifty years of engagement in Germany, Japan, and Korea, as well as more than ten years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should not be surprising, therefore, that any effort on the scale of that which the nation undertook then, now, or in the future takes time, commitment, and resources to have any chance of success. When the nation's goals include growing an enduring democratic form of government, progress can only be measured in tens of years. Bosnia-Herzegovina serves to emphasize this point. The fact that the Coalition Provisional Authority did none of the above exacerbated an already tense and vulnerable situation. Because the United States depended on the advice of Iraqi expatriates, some with suspect agendas, in developing and implementing U.S. occupation plans and policies, they alienated large segments of the population who had suffered directly at
Saddam's hands. Because Americans did not stop the looting they appeared soft on crime;
Arab society demands order and deals harshly with civil crimes.
Disbanding the Iraqi armed forces was a total humiliation for many Iraqis. Ambassador
Bremer, on poor advice, dumped the baby out with the bathwater. 14 He failed to account for the large numbers soldiers who had served honorably. Because American policy disbanded the Iraqi armed forces and never made any attempt to recognize a revered Iraqi institution, it created a large number of unemployed, armed young men who confronted a very bleak future, a cadre of disaffected military leaders, and a population that reflected favorably on the preSaddam era armed forces. In another sense, failure to obtain surrender convinced many Sunnis that Iraq was as yet undefeated.
When the national police force literally collapsed, the Americans did little to bring them back. The solution to the lawlessness that reigned in June 2003 was to authorize an AK-47 assault rifle in every home. In effect, the United States disarmed Iraq's security forces and law enforcement apparatus and armed everyone. The tragedies that accrued to coalition and Iraqi forces and civilians as a result of this decision are too numerous to recount. Because the occupation leaders failed to communicate expectations and intent to the population, the Iraqis remained in a state of fear and uncertainty, one that persists today.
U.S. forces continued to operate under Phase III ROE, which often led soldiers to resort to the hammer as the tool of first choice, precisely the same option employed by Saddam's thugs.
In some instances U.S. forces harassed and attacked the innocent and humiliated them in various ways that called for revenge. 15 And because coalition policy makers did not understand that not all Ba'athists were bad, they alienated entire professional classes of Iraqi society: the military, the bureaucrats and technocrats, teachers, and others.
In fairness, there are tremendous American and coalition successes to recognize, as well.
Deposing The United States has drawn terrorists to the battlefield of its choosing and is dealing continued mortal blows to known organizations. Moreover, the United States is discovering heretofore unknown linkages in terror networks that will allow interdiction on its terms now and in the future. America is in a strong position in the heart of the Arab Middle East to influence direction and certain states for the foreseeable future while at the same time protecting its homeland. The United States can help maintain that position upon its departure by staying the course in Iraq, and encouraging and supporting moderation and reform in the region. Finally, no one can argue the success of recent elections or the hope they portend for the future of not only Iraq but the greater Arab Middle East, as well.
THE WAY FORWARD
What can America do now that it is decisively engaged in Iraq and recognizes in hindsight some serious errors over the past two years? Should it press on with the same strategy? What are its chances for long-term success in Iraq? Have American leaders recognized the errors and are they addressing them? Or are they creating the environment that will breed new generations of recruits to fight America as is the case of Israel vis-à-vis Palestine?
There are a number of choices but really only two options. The United States can accelerate or eliminate major programs in order to expediently extract itself, hoping and rationalizing that everything will turn out as it envisioned in the beginning and believing that the The United States will have to carefully weigh any decisions to accelerate Iraqi security forces development and training programs. Where they are unavoidable, the United States must employ its leverage to mitigate risk. Though the Iraqi workforce is relatively well educated in the principles of its professions and vocations, which may be a surprise to some, the government sectors will require sustained U.S. support over the long term. The basic training and modernization of armed forces and bureaucracies is a fairly easy task but it is only the first step toward the total requirements that will lead to success. The subsequent steps provide the greatest challenge and take the longest time to successfully implement. These steps include inspiring professional cultures and ethics of service for the greater public good, and adhering to the primacy of the rule of law and civil rights. Their broad acceptance will take time, patience, commitment, and example.
Whether by design or coincidence the United States is making progress in developing government structures at a faster pace than the armed and other security forces. It should and must be this way. While the government stands up, builds infrastructures, gains confidence, and begins making decisions that positively affect the Iraqi people, the security apparatus is growing much slower. Again, this is as it should and must be. The security forces must mature over time into professional, ethical, and responsive entities answerable to the people and willingly subservient to duly elected and equally responsive civilian leaders. This appears simplistic, but it is the foundation upon which all else builds and depends. Otherwise, it is too easy for the people part of this equation to revert, either by choice, coercion, or cooption to the corruption and violence that they understood all too well in Saddam's regime.
The people of Iraq, as is the case anywhere, want certain guarantees from their government in order to trust and support it. Their demands are neither excessive nor unreasonable. They demand a sense of security, internal and external. They demand to be able to trust that the state security apparatus is fair, responsive to their needs, and not abusive of its powers. They demand a guarantee of their civil rights though they will accept a guarantee that their children can walk to and from school unmolested for now. Since most Iraqis lived in a cradle-to-grave welfare system, they demand a social safety net that provides for their needs during this period of unprecedented change in their lives. They want to know that basic services and support are available and equitable: electricity, consumable fuels, communications, food, and water. They demand a guarantee of access to all levels of education, quality health care, and opportunity. Their families should not have to resort to bailing putrid water from polluted canals for cooking and bathing. They demand to be assured that Iraqis will not squander or pocket their natural resources and that the West will not manipulate them. They demand to know that their government will represent them and respond to their needs. In this respect the United States is enjoying a certain amount of success. Recent elections bear this out. Yet, the average Iraqi would give up basic rights that the West takes for granted, at least temporarily, to achieve genuine security and stability. American equipment but will settle for European, western or eastern, with which they are familiar and which is less costly.
Seventh, execute an information campaign that continuously publicizes the benefits, progress, and sacrifices of the Iraqi security forces and emphasizes their commitment to serve and protect all Iraqis, their rights, and their homeland.
Obviously, each Iraqi security service will require programs tailored to its missions and relation to the public. Progress will be directly proportional to Western commitments to partner with Iraq for years to come. However, a cautionary note is appropriate at this point. In dealing with Iraqi security forces America will try to instill the ideals and discipline that makes its armed forces so great. And it must be disciplined in its approach. In a society that knows only the stick as the first choice for problem solving, America must consistently show that its way works better by its example. If the United States fails to do this, and fails to change the security forces' mentality to one of service to the public, then the United States fails in the long run.
As Americans become familiar with the new security forces and learn more about them, they may find that they do not trust the Iraqis, do not approve of their work ethic, or remain segregated and grow distant from them, interacting only as required. Iraqis may well feel the same about Americans. In a worst case, Americans treat them badly or in their perception
disrespectfully. Commanders at all levels whose soldiers associate with Iraqi security forces must reinforce professional interaction that recognizes Iraqis as the largest and most important coalition partner. This is especially important now and as America looks to the future and begins to meaningfully reduce its numbers deployed in the theater.
BASIC SERVICES
Progress in the building, renovating, and modernizing Iraq's infrastructure is slow, but it is gaining momentum. In a state where the people depended on the government for all services and even subsistence from cradle-to-grave, the challenge is daunting. In the first year and a half in Iraq the United States scarcely achieved the levels of service provided by Saddam's regime. The average Iraqi could not understand or believe that the mighty United States was incapable of immediately providing the same levels of service that Americans enjoyed at home.
They often concluded that the coalition was manipulating them to steal their resources, punishing them for Saddam's crimes, or a combination.
The average Baghdadi might have had a plausible argument that the coalition was manipulating Iraqi resources. Immediately following major combat operations, everything from water to cooking gas to electricity was unavailable. Iraqis failed to realize the impact of looting and the fact that in order for cities like Baghdad to enjoy regular services during Saddam's rule, the rest of the country did without. Additionally, the infrastructure had gone without regular maintenance and repairs for years and was in reality held together by the ingenuity of Iraqi engineers, station managers, and technicians.
Not understanding the poor state of the infrastructure, the Coalition Provisional Authority used international donations to award mega-contracts for rebuilding the national level infrastructure to capable international firms such as Bechtel. Thousands of contractors were invading the country. Average Iraqis believed that oil revenues were paying the foreigners.
Concurrently, contractors and military engineers began countrywide infrastructure assessments, which quickly exposed the enormity of problems, local to national. The breadth and depth of the challenge overwhelmed an uninformed, unprepared, and undermanned Coalition Provisional Authority. To make matters worse, the deteriorating security situation slowed all infrastructure efforts to a near standstill. Iraqi businessmen and tribal leaders saw no benefits from the promised employment boom, save that which division commanders provided through the Commander's Emergency Relief Program funds to fix schools, water distribution systems, electrical grids, and communications, and basically kick start local economies.
If nothing else, Iraqis knew their rights and their benefits. The lack services and jobs, exacerbated by increasing violence, sabotage, and summer heat, created extremely unstable conditions. To their credit, most Iraqis waited patiently. The coalition was able to struggle through the summer of 2003 and provide the minimum needs in major cities. Few areas outside the major cities saw any improvements at all. Almost two years later, the majority of Iraqis in much of the country are slowly seeing improvements in almost every category. Baghdadis are quick to point out that they are not still receiving the same levels of services as pre-war.
Though the coalition is making significant progress across the full spectrum of services, much remains to be done. American and international agencies and contractors are pressing on with national level projects including transportation and distribution systems, oil and agricultural production, and water, electrical, and communications infrastructures. The tangible benefits of these enormous undertakings are not and will not be evident for some time to come.
And the overhead costs for security remain unacceptably high.
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The planning and execution of projects to modernize Iraqi infrastructures continues and the end state will be equitable quality of life improvements countrywide. However, the United
States inevitably fails to get out the good news of its plans and progress and therefore fails to receive due credit. In the love-hate relationship that defines the American and Arab intercourse, America needs to receive credit in the region when and where credit is due.
America is still learning difficult lessons at the sub-national level, however. America undermines its efforts by not clearly explaining the benefits of long-term plans and programs and by an inability to then show that business will trickle down to local masons, factory workers, and vendors of every sort in the short term. Unemployed Iraqi craftsmen and professionals sit idly by and watch as foreign labor, contractors, and militaries build everything from two-room schools to national power grids. When they are hired it is often for mundane jobs and low pay.
America complicates its efforts by not understanding the hierarchies of Iraqi society, which include religious, tribal, familial, and municipal aspects, all of which are intertwined to some degree. In the rush to provide basic services early on, the United States often undermined traditional and municipal leaders' authorities because it did not appreciate that these leaders could not fulfill the duties of their positions to provide for their constituents' needs and expectations. And, as is often the case, Westerners believe that they have the correct answers and those they are appointed to help do not. On the personal level, which is always essential to success, Iraqis are willing to partner.
To be successful, the United States must address these and other cultural issues. Local through national level leaders must increasingly assume the decision making role in a sovereign
Iraq. In effect, the United States must assume the role of junior partner and follow through on decisions in support of the Iraqi government. These steps may not fit into American goals and objectives, but they are a crucial means of establishing sense of participation, ownership, and commitment.
The United States must constantly advertise international contributions, now in the tens of billions of dollars, at press conferences, in newspapers, and on television and radio. It must also highlight the Iraqi partnership. But the United States cannot just say that fifty or a hundred billion dollars are allocated for Iraq. It must explain that these funds are contributions and not loans; they are grants by a supportive international community led by the United States.
Further, the United States must categorize expenditures that are already planned, by province, and lay out start dates for major projects and the types of contractors and labor required. Iraqis are entrepreneurs and if they believe they can do business supplying or otherwise participating in these projects and programs, they will.
INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS
The coalition was slow to realize the emergence of a number of distinct insurgencies in Indeed, a second major insurgency, consisting of radical Islamists, grew, as well. In addition to a number of homegrown groups, jihadists were infiltrating Iraq but in small numbers.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the headliner and inspirational leader of many of the radicals. forces, it will have to allow operational Iraqi forces the latitude to deal in their way with those who are terrorizing the Iraqi population now. The family whose immediate priority is security demands as much. This will be brutal in the short term, but given the tools and freedom of action to seek and destroy those who are committing terrorist acts against Iraqis, Iraqi methods will be successful in the long term. The ability to balance the necessity of extreme measures with the long term development of security forces that do not threaten the law abiding public is crucial to the growth of democracy in Iraq. But it is a price that Americans will eventually figure out is worth paying.
Many Iraqis have seen atrocities that the West can hardly imagine. They will only gain confidence in their government and security forces if those forces can provide security and stability. In Mosul in February 2005, the Iraqi police captured an Iraqi insurgent who they confirmed had beheaded a hostage. They obviously sent a clear message to him, and they used insurgent tactics to emphasize their intent to eradicate similar actions in that area. The police filmed him begging for his life and the film was televised in Iraq. The message was clear:
terrorists will be hunted down and brought to justice. The more important and lasting messages were: the terrorists were not as tough as they appear and the Iraqi security forces were making headway against this scourge of violence. The education of the young is paramount to success of a democratic Iraq. While programs of this nature formally lie outside the purview of the military, for all intents and purposes, it is the military that is influencing education at this time. Soldiers are building and renovating schools, donating school supplies, interacting with teachers and students daily, and providing medical services and other support. This aspect of the U.S. contribution to Iraq is too critical to leave unattended while experts and agencies await a secure and stable environment.
FOCUS ON YOUTH

THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)
The UN must play an increasingly active role in Iraq. To continue to sit on the sidelines, as it has done for years, is unacceptable anymore. Iraq is on its way to success and though the fruits of the Coalition's hard labor will not be clearly visible for some time to come, those fruits will nevertheless ripen as time goes by. The UN must begin to prepare for that eventuality so that at the defining moment it will be able to stand on the stage as having contributed to the liberation of yet another oppressed people. To do otherwise will be to further undermine the organization's already poor and declining reputation while running the risk of exclusion from broader endeavors in the region.
Granted, the UN was and is on the ground but its presence has not amounted to much. In the years immediately following Operation DESERT STORM the UN exercised its authority in Iraq. More than anything else, it provided cover for certain states to help enforce sanctions without serious concern about being labeled a puppet of the United States. The no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq achieved some successes. However, focus and commitment waned over the years. The recently successful elections in Iraq should be the pretext by which the UN reengages in Iraq. The timing and opportunity will never be better. Iraq's leaders will warmly receive the UN, though threats to UN missions would persist. UN reentry would bolster the rebuilding process and add legitimacy to the elected government and perhaps prod regional governments to be more helpful. UN programs, so necessary to nation building, would add efficiencies that America alone can only inefficiently achieve now and in the future.
THE REGION
The United States must approach the regional aspects of its Iraq endeavors with extreme care. In addition to kinetic options, the United States must revisit some initiatives and create movement that contributes to regional security. The United States must: reengage in the IsraelPalestine crisis, seek to moderate Iran and eliminate its programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction or effects, influence Syria, and reassess the positioning of US forces in the region.
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
The Israel-Palestine question will not go away. Though recent developments are encouraging, interested parties have seen them before. It is all too easy, at the slightest provocation, for both sides to resort to their traditionally intractable positions, which serve only the radical factions on both sides and promise a continued spiral of violence and hatred.
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. The United States has at its disposal a number of effective tools with which to hold their attention: withholding lucrative aid packages to both sides, pending progress toward a workable coexistence; revisiting carte blanche support of Israel in the UN; reviving regional proposals, including the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah proposal for a Palestinian / Arab peace with Israel, which was shelved without comment by Israel the day it was released. 21 In the face of tangible progress and an evenhanded U.S.
approach, Hamas' influence might be muted.
Yasser Arafat's timely demise was a blessing that the international community must take to heart and take advantage of. Abdullah's proposal deserves consideration not only because it provides a thoughtful way forward but more importantly, it pushes other Arab leaders to the States is making progress through allies such as Great Britain, it may achieve greater moderation in the regime in the long-term through direct engagement now. At a minimum, direct U.S. involvement would serve to buoy and perhaps encourage the muzzled majority. This success is not an end; it is a beginning. As security and stability improve, the international community in partnership with the Iraqi people must roll up its sleeves and continue the hard work of creating a stabilizing entity that acts as a catalyst for reform in the region, which in the long term lends stability to one more region of the world and reduces the major terrorist threats to the United States and the West.
The coalition, which now includes a vested Iraqi leadership, is succeeding in Iraq. The list of successes is impressive: deposing and capturing Saddam, rebuilding an infrastructure he left in shambles, providing Iraqis with hope for a better future, and establishing systems that will lead to a representative government of and for the people and that do not threaten any segment of the population or region. As successes grow and confidence among Iraqis improves, most recently bolstered by successful elections, the elected government of Iraq will set its course and return as a contributing member of the international community. To be sure, many challenges lie ahead. The United States cannot let down its guard and it must accept that combat operations will continue for some time.
Moreover, the United States must accept that it cannot achieve instant change or success in Iraq. Success requires presence, commitment, engagement, even idealism, and the willingness of the Iraqi people to take the lead for change at home and, by their example, in the region. As the United States helps establish governmental structures, especially in the security line, it must remain thoroughly engaged in order to nurture this growth and institutionalize the foundations that make for successful representative government.
In the rush to turn over responsibility and authority to the Iraqis to either close it on America once it passes all authorities or emulate and modify U.S.
systems and institutions to fit their cultural and religious norms and traditions.
Undoubtedly, the United States will leave a legacy. The legacy it leaves is governed by its attitude, commitment, ideals, and the end state it strives to achieve: a stable, peaceful government, mindful of civil rights, that represents the people and builds the institutions and checks and balances to guarantee that an individual or group will have an almost impossible task seizing power in a coup d'état or by usurping powers over time.
America must, therefore, remain engaged in Iraq for the foreseeable future. A host of reasons, not the least of which are economic benefits to all parties and stability in the greater Arab Middle East, require it. If Americans stay the course with their Iraqi hosts, they will not forget. And, yes, Americans must learn from Iraqis, as well. Developing personal, professional, and official relationships based on mutual respect and a common vision of a better future for
Iraq provide an opportunity to possibly achieve the broader change in the Middle East that the President envisions. However, if the United States proceeds too fast, opting for quick fixes, and fails to look beyond the short term, then it should come as no surprise that it fails in the long term. In the end America will have created a system that is as fragile to normal use as the Iraqi infrastructure it is struggling to rebuild now. American impatience will not work here. The
United States and Iraq must remain committed until our mutual goals are verifiably achieved.
A common vision is especially important in the security structures. No other governmental structure touches the people so intimately. Therefore, the quality of effort and commitment must reflect its importance. Most Iraqis are willing to learn and give U.S. institutions a chance, especially if they perceive Americans as committed partners and not as would-be masters.
Americans must balance their approach so that this partnership focuses on solving problems
and learning together what works best in Iraqi culture. Again, setting the conditions for success requires presence, commitment, engagement, and idealism and a willing Iraqi partner.
First and foremost, Iraqis must see that their government acts in the best interest of Iraqis in both its domestic and international policies. And security forces must be seen as strong and successful in restoring order. To shed its label as occupier, the coalition must be able to convince the Iraqis of the benefits of a longer-term relationship of cooperation and friendship.
Regionally, the United States can set into motion a number of initiatives that will bear fruit in time. First, America must exercise its influence over Israel and the Palestinians to achieve an On-the-horizon or over-the-horizon presence in the region may be just as effective as physical presence and perhaps more so.
The full weight of American prestige, leadership, and blood are committed to Iraq, the war on terror at its sources, and democratic reforms in the Middle East but the job is far from complete. Persistence, initiative, and ingenuity in cooperation with allies, friends, and coalition partners, and an evenhanded approach in dealings with all states in the region are essential to strategic and long-term success. Middle East including the common perceptions that: the Middle East has been victimized by the West to exploit its resources; the United States practices double standards to prop up its client state, Israel; the European colonial powers divided up the Middle East to insure constant strife among the Arabs; and the West is attempting to corrupt the purity of Islam. Since before the fall of the Ottoman Empire, would-be leaders of the Arab world have tried to spark an Arab revivalpan-Arabism, Socialism, Palestine, and economic blocks have not had that effect. Over the past twenty-plus years Islam has had a unifying effect on many Muslims and some see it as the one way to fend off the Western threat. 14 There is debate on who actually gave the order to formally disband the Iraqi armed forces. Ambassador Bremer was given broad authorities upon his arrival in Iraq and he made the decision, based on the advice of his coalition and American staff and Iraqi expatriates, and his current understanding of the status of those forces. The ambassador has not commented officially except to say that he was left with no other choice when the Iraqi armed forces disintegrated. 15 Abu Ghraib stands out as the most grievous of humiliations but in other cases the coalition was duped by individuals or groups who used their access to coalition forces, especially Americans, to torment their own enemies.
16 Ralph Peters, Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003), 326. 17 The slogans aired during the 2004 presidential campaign and since are dangerous to Iraqis who are in the trenches with America, U.S. and coalition soldiers, and overall success. These slogans can become the self-inflicted wound from which there is no recovery. But they resonate with elements of U.S. society and once stated , the expectation is that the promise will be kept. Finally, rather than steeling the determination of Iraqis to assume the fight against the insurgents, such pronouncements have the opposite affect in which the insurgents wait us out and surge as we depart. The Sunni insurgents believe that once the coalition departs they will win any fights with Kurds or Shi'as, whom they view as inferior. They would drag the country into civil war in the belief that they will resume their rule in the end. 18 The British model used in Oman is instructive. In Oman, the British seconded NCOs and officers at the company level and the result was probably the best-trained 'leg' infantrymen in the Gulf at the time. Though the British program ended in the early 1970s, it founded a professional institution that proved itself in the mid-1970s when the Omani government successfully put down an armed insurrection. The British model is worthy of emulation in Iraq. U.S. Special Forces provide equally useful examples. 19 The costs to the reconstruction efforts in terms of danger zone bonuses, insurance, transportation, and physical security are variously reported in the range of thirty to fifty percent of each contract. Such costs are prohibitive and cannot be sustained without unacceptable reductions in the scope of reconstruction or the infusion of additional billions of dollars. Vintage Books, 1999), 272, 284. Yasser Arafat was not a visionary leader. His great success was the fact that he had carried Palestinians from that "country of words" to some real political gains. When he landed in Palestine in 1994, Arafat returned to his homeland as a conquering hero. His great failure was in not handing over the reins to the cadre of educated and savvy Palestinians who were ready to take Arafat's success to its logical conclusion, a state. Instead, Arafat created an unwieldy, unimaginative, and corrupt autocracy that curbed more rights and muzzled dissent. Had he knelt down and kissed the ground of his homeland upon his return, convened a national convention to achieve a consensus and vision for Palestine, and then bowed out to assume a position of prominence as an elder statesman, his legacy would have been one of truly great accomplishment and the Palestinian people would have been the beneficiaries.
23 Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994) , 87.
